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PLEA BARGAINING AND THE DEATH PENALTY
Albert W. Alschuler*
I am about to describe the intersection of two dreadful monsters of
American criminal justice: the practice of capital punishment and the
practice of plea bargaining.
I. THE DEATH TARIFF
With other scholars, I once applied for a federal grant to determine
how many of the inmates on death row were there only because they
had declined plea bargains that could have saved their lives. We ap-
plied during the Reagan years and didn't get the grant. The number
remains unknown.
But one of my co-applicants, the late Welsh White, asked exper-
ienced capital defenders to make their best estimates. Millard Farmer
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Julius Kreeger Professor of Criminal Law and
Criminology Emeritus, the University of Chicago.
This Article is an edited version of my remarks to the Symposium Media, Race, and the Death
Penalty at the DePaul University College of Law on March 6, 2008. I was not a scheduled
speaker but was to moderate a panel discussion. One of the scheduled speakers was a long-time
friend, mentor, and hero, Judge R. Eugene Pincham. When I telephoned Judge Pincham a few
days before the symposium, he had just returned home after a twenty-day stay in the hospital.
We discussed briefly the cancer ravaging his body. Then we reminisced for fifteen or twenty
minutes, touching on the wonderful argument he made to the Illinois Supreme Court the first
time I first heard him speak, a memorable train ride we shared, an even more memorable Christ-
mas party in Bridgeport (parts of which might better be forgotten), the help he gave me in
preparing my first law review article, the fun we had when he ran for office (it would have been
more fun to win), and the series of student interns I sent him while teaching out of state-interns
who not only worked in his office but also, at his unsolicited invitation, lived with him through-
out the summer. Judge Pincham's voice was strong, and he was entirely himself. He said that he
still planned to speak at the symposium. It was only on the morning of March 6 that he con-
cluded speaking that day was impossible. He died four weeks later.
When Judge Pincham withdrew from the symposium, I designated myself pinch-hitter and
cobbled together some remarks on plea bargaining and the death penalty, a subject on which I'd
touched in publications that focused primarily on other subjects. Most of the material presented
here has appeared before, but Andrea Lyon and the editors of the DePaul Law Review thought
it would be good to bring it together. They encouraged me to publish these remarks.
I flatter myself that Judge Pincham would not have minded what I have to say. Lawyers
(especially judges and defense attorneys) who oppose plea bargaining are a small minority. They
say things that mark them as screwy in the eyes of many other lawyers. Pincham happily paid
that price, and what he told me in 1967 is still the truth: "Plea bargaining cheapens the system.
It encourages the defendant to believe that he has sold a commodity and that he has, in a sense,
gotten away with something." Amen, Gene, and rest in peace.
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declared that "75 percent of the defendants who have been executed
since 1976 could have avoided the death sentence by accepting a plea
offer."' Stephen Bright and Michael Burt maintained that half of the
defendants executed in America "at some point had an opportunity to
enter a guilty plea that would have eliminated the possibility of a
death sentence." 2
Consider what those numbers mean. America executes people not
only for the crime of committing an aggravated murder but also for
the crime of standing trial. In many cases and probably most, standing
trial is as much a necessary condition of execution as committing a
capital offense.
The case of John Spenkelink shows how the system works. Spenke-
link was the first person executed involuntarily in the United States
after a de facto moratorium on executions that began in 1967 ended
ten years later.3 His lawyer, Brian T. Hayes, explained why his case
was not resolved through plea bargaining:
We bargained. The judge began the process by complaining to me
and the prosecutor that he did not want to try the case. "One
drifter kills another drifter," he said. "That's not worth two weeks
of the court's time." The prosecutor responded by offering a guilty
plea to second-degree murder with the recommendation of a life
sentence. It was a good deal, but Spenk turned it down.
I'd encountered clients like him before, and I thought I knew how
to handle them. I drew up a formal statement that said, "I, John
Spenkelink, have been offered such and such a deal. I have been
advised by my attorney that I have little chance of acquittal and
that, if I reject the deal, I will probably be executed. Nevertheless,
being of sound mind, I hereby reject the proposed bargain and in-
struct my attorney to present my case to a jury." I put lines on the
statement for Spenk and three witnesses to sign, and I walked into
Spenk's cell with three jail guards. In other cases, my clients have
looked at the statement, looked at the guards, and said, "Let's talk."
1. WELSH S. WHITE, LITIGATING IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN CAPI-
TAL CASES 145 (2006).
2. Id. at 146.
3. See Wikipedia, John Arthur Spenkelink, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilJohnArthur-
Spenkelink (last visited Mar. 16, 2009). The execution of Gary Gilmore in 1977 marked the end
of the death penalty moratorium, but Gilmore was a "volunteer" who instructed his lawyers not
to seek a stay of execution and who complained to the courts that his execution had been im-
properly delayed. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013, 1015 nn.1 & 4 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Spenkelink's execution came two years after Gilmore's. The ten-year moratorium
that preceded Gilmore's execution resulted from the vigorous litigation of death penalty issues
in the Supreme Court and other courts and from a 1972 Supreme Court decision holding all
existing death penalty statutes unconstitutional. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
[Vol. 58:671
2009] PLEA BARGAINING AND THE DEATH PENALTY 673
Not Spenk. He took a pen and signed, and the three guards signed
as witnesses.4
John Spenkelink's final words before the State of Florida electrocuted
him were probably not original. He declared, "Capital punishment:
Them without the capital get the punishment."'5
When Hannah Arendt spoke of the banality of evil, she referred to
the Holocaust and to a greater evil than that of the American criminal
justice system. 6 But Arendt's phrase may come to mind as one hears
bargaining lawyers discuss whether to take or spare a life. As in
Spenkelink's case, the answer may turn on whether the prosecutor
and judge believe that killing a particular defendant is worth a week
or two of their time.
An Oakland, California defense attorney recalled a more aggra-
vated case than Spenkelink's.7 The defendant had planned a robbery-
murder and shot his crippled victim in the face three times. "If he had
killed his mother," the attorney said, "I might have been able to do
something for him."'8 The prosecutor offered to permit a guilty plea to
4. Telephone Interview with Brian T. Hayes (1984). A law review article by the late John
Kaplan prompted me to call Hayes. See John Kaplan, Administering Capital Punishment, 36 U.
FLA. L. REV. 177 (1984). Kaplan, an opponent of the death penalty, based his opposition partly
on the danger of executing the innocent. Writing in 1984, however, five years before history's
first DNA exoneration, see Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 57
(2008), he made a concession that no death penalty opponent would make today. "It is true," he
declared, "that in the modern history of the death penalty, the last thirty-some years, probably
no innocent person has been executed." Kaplan, supra, at 186. Kaplan then wrote:
If we regard as innocence merely innocence of a capital crime, despite guilt of a lesser
crime, the chances of executing somebody who is innocent go up very sharply. Indeed,
... I am convinced that the first involuntary execution in the United States since the
long moratorium was in this category. John Spinkellink had killed a man in what ap-
peared to be a classic case of voluntary manslaughter, as his victim had homosexually
assaulted him earlier.
Id. Justice Brennan later reiterated Kaplan's claim in a dissenting opinion. See Pulley v. Harris,
465 U.S. 37, 69 n.5 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Justice Brennan's view, Kaplan's analysis
showed the arbitrariness of Florida's post-Furman regime of capital punishment.
Skeptical of Kaplan's claim, I telephoned Hayes, who confirmed my suspicion that Spenke-
link's crime was not manslaughter. The defendant's testimony that the victim had assaulted him
was uncorroborated. In addition, the alleged sexual assault had occurred two weeks before the
killing, and Spenkelink had continued to travel with the victim throughout the two-week period.
Spenkelink's case may illustrate the arbitrariness of the post-Furman regime of capital punish-
ment, but a case in which the alleged provocation occurred two weeks before the homicide was
not "a classic case of voluntary manslaughter." The jury probably did not convict John Spenke-
link of the wrong crime. The critical roll of the dice in our arbitrary system of capital punish-
ment had come earlier.
5. Wikipedia, supra note 3.
6. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1964).




murder and to recommend a life sentence. This sentence would have
made the defendant eligible for parole in seven years. The defense
attorney urged the defendant to accept the offer and advised him that
he would probably be executed if he stood trial. The defendant's only
response was, "You don't believe in my case."9 The jury convicted the
defendant in less than an hour, and the death penalty was imposed.
This defendant was executed not only for the crime of being a mur-
derer but also for the crime of being an optimist-for what his attor-
ney called an inability to think 100 yards in front of himself. We live
in a nation that kills people for exercising their constitutional rights.
II. MOCKING THE DEATH PENALTY
Plea bargaining undermines the most common rationale for the
death penalty. Proponents of this penalty maintain that some crimes
are so horrible that they simply require it. They insist that no lesser
punishment can adequately express the community's condemnation.10
But the actions of American prosecutors convey an entirely different
message: No lesser punishment can adequately express the commu-
nity's condemnation unless the accused pleads guilty. For defendants
who agree to save the government the costs of a trial, lesser punish-
ments are just fine. These defendants' horrible crimes do not demand
death after all. In the immortal words of Gilda Radner, "Never
mind." Plea bargaining devalues the death penalty. It changes what
the death penalty is about.
III. ENSURING INEQUALITY
Plea bargaining also reveals that efforts to promote the even-
handed administration of capital punishment are empty and cosmetic.
Ted Bundy was one of the worst of the worst. He was executed, but
only because he turned down a deal that his lawyers begged him to
accept."1 Sandra Lockett, the defendant in one of the Supreme
Court's leading death penalty decisions,1 2 was far from the worst of
the worst. She was minimally involved in a robbery that ended in an
9. Id.
10. The Supreme Court wrote in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976), "[T]he deci-
sion that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression
of the community's belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity
that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death." The Court quoted a columnist's
statement that "a crime, or a series of crimes [may be] so gross, so heinous, so cold-blooded that
anything short of death seems an inadequate response." Id. at 184 n.30 (quoting William Rasp-
berry, Death Sentence, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1976, at A27).
11. See WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES 57-60 (1991).
12. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
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unanticipated killing by a co-felon. She was sentenced to death be-
cause she had a possible defense and turned down offers that could
have saved her life. Lockett's co-felon, the triggerman without a de-
fense, pleaded guilty in exchange for a life term.13
When Berkeley law professor Malcolm M. Feeley visited death row
in Tennessee, he noticed an inmate in kitchen whites delivering meals
to the death row inmates.14 It took a moment before Feeley realized
that the inmate was James Earl Ray.15 Ray, the probable assassin of
Martin Luther King, Jr.,16 had entered a plea agreement. He was
therefore on one side of the bars while less iniquitous killers awaited
execution on the other.
In America's bizarre system of criminal justice, a serial killer may
reduce the likelihood of his execution by committing additional
murders. The more unexplained disappearances a killer can solve, the
greater his bargaining power. In 2003, the very worst of the worst,
Gary Leon Ridgway, the Green River Killer, escaped execution
through a plea agreement that required him to assist in locating the
remains of his victims.' 7 Ridgway, the most prolific serial killer in
American history, pleaded guilty to forty-eight charges of aggravated
first degree murder.18 King County Prosecuting Attorney Norm
Maleng then congratulated himself: "This agreement was the avenue
to the truth. And in the end, the search for the truth is still why we
have a criminal justice system."' 9
13. See WHITE, supra note 11, at 60-62.
14. See E-mail from Malcolm Feeley to author (Mar. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
15. By keeping Ray physically separated from both the general prison population and death
row inmates, his work assignment protected him from the private death penalty that some of his
fellow inmates might have been pleased to administer. It also kept Ray, an earlier escapee, in a
secure place away from the perimeter of the prison.
16. In 1997, with the approval of Dr. King's widow and his other children, Dexter King shook
Ray's hand and expressed his belief in Ray's innocence. See Kevin Sack, A Visitor for James
Earl Ray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, at E2. There is no reason whatever to credit confessions
induced by the threat of death, and plea bargaining in capital cases settles the question of an
accused killer's guilt in a way that should satisfy no one.
17. Defense Proffer at 3-4, Washington v. Ridgway, No. 01-1-10270-9 SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct.
June 10, 2003), available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/localllinks/plea-agreement.
pdf.
18. Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty at 7, Washington v. Ridgway, No. 01-1-10270-9
SEA (Wash. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2003), available at http:/seattletimes.nwsource.comlnews/localI
links/statement of defendant.pdf.
19. See Wikipedia, Gary Ridgway, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GaryRidgway (last visited
Mar. 16, 2009).
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IV. DOES BARGAINING REALLY SAVE LIVES?
It may take a great lawyer to save an exceptionally brutal killer
from a death sentence by arguing to a jury, but almost any lawyer can
save a brutal killer by bargaining. Philadelphia District Attorney
Lynne Abraham has been called the "deadliest D.A." because she
seeks the death penalty in nearly every case in which the defendant is
eligible.20 In even the most egregious cases, however, Abraham's of-
fice reputedly foregoes the death penalty when capital defendants
agree to plead guilty.21
District Attorney Abraham may be a well-meaning public servant.
Like others socialized to treat plea bargaining as routine, she is proba-
bly oblivious to the fact that her methods are the twenty-first century
equivalent of Torquemada's. Abraham may not fully realize the pur-
pose for which she uses the death penalty. What is familiar tends to
become what is right.
Defense attorneys who champion plea bargaining in capital cases
maintain that it saves lives, and of course it does save individual lives.
Lynne Abraham's prosecutors may seek the death penalty partly to
gain plea bargaining leverage, but they are prepared to carry out their
threats when defendants refuse to yield. Whether plea bargaining
reduces the total number of executions, however, is an open question.
Would District Attorney Abraham continue to seek capital punish-
ment in almost all death-eligible cases if she could gain no bargaining
leverage by doing so? Would the taxpayers of Philadelphia-indeed,
would even the taxpayers of Texas-be prepared to pay the high cost
of capital trials and prolonged capital appeals in all or most of the
cases in which prosecutors threaten the death penalty today? Fiscal
concerns aside, do Americans truly want more state-sponsored killing
than they have? Might the elimination of plea bargaining in capital
cases leave the number of executions constant but produce a system in
which the executed were selected more on the basis of what they did
and less on the basis of whether they exercised their rights? Might
eliminating the use of official death threats as leverage make capital
punishment less useful to prosecutors and legislators and actually
hasten its abolition? No one knows the answers to these questions.
Plea bargaining allows guerilla warfare against the death penalty in
individual cases, but in the absence of this practice, the warfare might
be unnecessary.
20. Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest DA, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 16, 1995, at 22.
21. See WHrTE, supra note 1, at 147-48.
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V. WASTE AND OTHER BARGAINING TACTICS
The key to successful bargaining may lie in threatening to increase
the financial burdens of the other side. The defense attorney's goal is
often to persuade the prosecutor that a trial will cost too much. Welsh
White describes how Edward Staffman saved the life of Sampson
Armstrong by bargaining with five county commissioners.22 Staffman
first secured the court's permission to retain six expert witnesses.
Then he met with each of the county commissioners individually and
observed that compensation for the defense experts would exceed
$100,000 if the case went to trial. Staffman suggested that this expen-
diture would not be a good use of resources. The commissioners were
persuaded, and they in turn convinced the prosecutor to make a deal.
Staffman's proposal included a face-saver for the officials: Some of
the money saved by avoiding trial could "be used to provide a suitable
memorial for the victims." '23
Similarly, Michael Burt saved the life of Mendes Brown by alleging
that for thirty-six years no Chinese American, Filipino American, or
Hispanic American had served as foreperson of a San Francisco grand
jury.24 In a criminal justice system that is alternately miserly and prof-
ligate, this allegation generated three years of costly pretrial litigation.
Eventually the victim's son withdrew his opposition to a plea agree-
ment that would preclude the death penalty, and the prosecutor made
a deal.
As the Brown case illustrates, many prosecutors have delegated de
facto control of the state's most awesome penalty to private parties,
the victims' families. The attitudes of these families range from ada-
mant opposition to the death penalty to insistence that death is the
only appropriate punishment and that prosecutors should not bargain
about it. People who would be immediately disqualified from serving
on a defendant's jury direct the government's power to decide
whether he will live or die. Deferring to survivors makes application
of the death penalty more arbitrary.
Defense attorneys now find it advantageous to bargain with family
members as well as prosecutors. They may promise to conceal embar-
rassing information (for example, that the victim was a prostitute), to
disclose information that the prosecutor has not revealed to the fami-
lies, to make no statements to the press, to ensure that the defendant
will not seek to profit from his crime by writing or granting interviews,
22. Id. at 150.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 150-51.
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and to arrange a meeting between the defendant and the family mem-
bers at which the defendant will explain his crime and express his
remorse.
2 5
Defense attorneys also approach their clients' families, for "[t]he
participation of a defendant's family members or loved ones will often
be critical" in persuading the defendant to plead guilty.2 6 A defense
attorney's most challenging bargaining sessions are often those he
conducts with his client. Many defendants, uncertain that life without
parole is worth living, seem more willing to risk their own deaths than
their lawyers can stomach. Attorneys sometimes go to extraordinary
lengths to persuade clients to accept what the lawyers, at least, regard
as life-saving deals.
The record in Brady v. United States,27 in which the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of plea bargaining, is revealing. 28 The de-
fendant, charged with a capital crime, was detained for several
months. He insisted throughout this period that he was innocent and
that he wanted a jury trial. After conscientious investigation, how-
ever, his attorney concluded that he had "never had [a case] where the
defendants had tied themselves up in a sack like they had in this
one."' 29 The attorney informed the defendant that he "just couldn't go
to a jury... [b]ecause it would be almost sure conviction and possibly
a death penalty. ' 30 The attorney told the defendant that "he would be
convicted beyond a shadow of a doubt."'3'
The defense attorney had two allies in his effort to persuade the
defendant to plead guilty, the trial judge and the defendant's mother.
The trial judge announced from the bench that he thought the defen-
dant "might get the death penalty. ' 32 Moreover, when the defense
attorney told the judge in chambers that he thought a guilty plea prob-
ably would be entered at a later date, the judge replied, "Well, I think
you are very wise, because I was certainly going to submit the death
penalty to the jury. '33 The attorney dutifully reported this comment
to the defendant.34
25. See id. at 153-55.
26. Id. at 159.
27. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
28. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea,
47 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 55-58 (1975).
29. Appendix to the Briefs at 64, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (No. 119963).
30. Id. at 74-75.
31. Id. at 70.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 72.
34. Id. Entirely disregarding these facts, the Supreme Court wrote in a footnote, "In Brady's
case, there is no claim . . . that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if
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The defendant's mother later attempted to visit the defendant in jail
but found that "it wasn't visiting hours. '35 She testified:
I went through the alley of the city jail where he was being held and
I kept yelling, "Brady, Brady." Then-then there was somebody,
some fellow up there that yelled, "Is there a Brady here?" So then
Brady came to the window. It was upstairs. I don't know how
many floors. Brady came to the window and he said, "Mom, what
are you doing? You are going to get yourself in trouble," and I just
said, "For God's sake, plead guilty. They are going to give you the
death sentence."'36
When it became apparent that a co-defendant would probably testify
against him, the defendant agreed to plead guilty. The defense attor-
ney reported that he "felt very gratified when [the defendant] decided
to change his plea in that we saved him from a death penalty in my
opinion. 37
The Supreme Court held in Brady that the threat of execution did
not render the defendant's guilty plea involuntary.38 It distinguished a
nineteenth century case, Bram v. United States,39 in which the Court
had said that every confession must be "free and voluntary: that is,
... not... extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained
by any direct or implied promises, however slight."' 40 The Brady
Court wrote, "Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly
coercive impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by
the presence and advice of counsel.""41
Professor White described a three-hour meeting in which Scharlette
Holderman, a mitigation specialist, encouraged Pierre Rausini, a capi-
tal defendant, to consider how his execution would affect his family:
[Holderman] talked about her experiences in "attending Florida ex-
ecutions." Among other things, she talked about the anguish suf-
fered by Ted Bundy's mother when she witnessed Bundy's
execution. Bundy's mother not only had to witness her son's execu-
tion but was taunted and harassed by death penalty supporters....
After hearing what she said, Rausini said, "I'll think about it."
Later, he accepted the [prosecutor]'s offer. 42
convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 751 n.8 (1970).
35. Appendix to the Briefs, supra note 29, at 38.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 66.
38. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755.
39. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
40. Id. at 542-43.
41. Brady, 397 U.S. at 754. Contra Alsehuler, supra note 28, at 55 ("A guilty plea entered at
gunpoint is no less involuntary because an attorney is present to explain how the gun works.").
42. WnrTE, supra note 1, at 162-63.
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VI. DEMEANING THE ADVOCATE'S ROLE
The practice of plea bargaining often transforms criminal defense
attorneys from courtroom champions into the point men and women
of a coercive system. The principal function of counsel is to explain to
their clients just how the legal system's armaments work and to force
these clients to recognize the coercive power of the alternatives they
face. Of course the lawyers are not to be faulted for the message they
deliver. They would violate their duty to their clients if they failed to
deliver it. How forceful a lawyer should be in advising a client not to
exercise his rights, however, can be an excruciating question. More
than thirty years ago, a Chicago public defender declared, "A lawyer
shirks his duty when he does not coerce his client. ' 43 I commented:
[T]his statement suggests a fundamental dilemma for any defense
attorney working under the constraints of the guilty-plea system.
When a lawyer refuses to "coerce his client," he insures his own
failure; the foreseeable result is usually a serious and unnecessary
penalty [even his client's execution] that ... it should have been the
lawyer's duty to prevent. When a lawyer does "coerce his client,"
however, he also insures his failure; he damages the attorney-client
relationship, confirms the cynical suspicions of the client, undercuts
a constitutional right, and incurs the resentment of the person
whom he seeks to serve. The defense attorney's lot is therefore not
a happy one-until he gets used to it.4 4
Plea bargaining perverts the role of counsel as it trivializes the pur-
poses of the death penalty.
43. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1310 (1975).
44. Id.
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